In order to evaluate the role of Sweden and Finland in NATO and its regional-global impacts, Ankara Center for Crisis and Political Studies (ANKASAM) made an interview with Lieutenant Colonel (Retired) Walter Rick Landgraf, Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI).

1. Article 42-7 of the EU Treaty. Article 42-7 of the EU Treaty states that in the event of an armed attack on an EU member, the other members are obliged to assist “by all appropriate means”. This Article can be interpreted in a variety of ways, including military assistance. What is the necessity of Sweden and Finland’s membership of NATO?

The two countries’ pursuit of NATO membership following Russia’s full-invasion of Ukraine was driven by a dramatic and sudden change in threat perceptions by the elites of both countries. This was enabled by a change in perception among the public. The latter factor is a key variable. The publics’ desire to abandon formal military neutrality and instead opt for NATO membership provided the necessary legitimacy for the Swedish and Finnish governments to pursue joining the alliance. It might not have happened otherwise; then again, joining NATO has largely been an elite-driven phenomenon in the post-Cold War era.

The key difference between the accession of Finland and Sweden and those of previous enlargement rounds is that the public-facing narrative about pursuing membership was characterized by realist and rationalist calculations: Finland and Sweden opted to bandwagon with the most powerful security actor in Europe, NATO, against the most immediate percieved external threat, Russia. Membership in NATO provided the two countries the best, if the only, way to obtain a national security guarantee. In earlier enlargements, the moves were sold mainly to western publics as a way to enable democracy and spread peace and stability across Europe.

Moreover, and critically, the formerly communist countries which sought NATO membership saw it as a way to gain civilizational belonging within “the West,” as embodied by NATO. NATO membership was percieved as a stamp of approval, as in Brussels proclaiming: “you are now officially part of Europe.” In this round, on the contrary, no one seriously questioned Sweden and Finland’s identities as already firmly part of “Europe” and “the West” — since they had been EU members for nearly two decades. In this manner, it was rational and realist calculations which drove the process in the cases of Finland and Sweden. This was of course a driver for other countries’ pursuit of membership in the late 1990s and early 2000s, but it was never articulated in that fashion in the public discourse.

Regarding the issue of a security guarantee provided through membership in the EU or NATO, it is evident that Sweden and Finland percieved their EU membership as insufficient in meeting their security needs. At the heart of the matter is the fact that Article Five of the NATO charter is underwritten by the United States, specifically the threat of nuclear retaliation if another NATO ally is attacked. Article Five has been invoked only once in NATO’s history, that being after the September 11, 2001 attacks against the United States.

2. What are the competences that Sweden and Finland’s membership brings to NATO, especially in the Baltic Sea and the region?

Both Sweden and Finland’s militaries have been interoperable with NATO forces for many years. They bring modern, sophisticated, and capable militaries, albeit quite small, as compared to the size of the American or Turkish forces, for example. It is probably too early to tell if there will be a dramatic difference in the security situation in the Baltic Sea region, as the two countries were already quasi-NATO members, and therefore informally incorporated into NATO defense planning, before their formal accession. Nonetheless, now NATO defense planners will have the added benefit of including Finnish and Swedish forces into formal force planning scenarios. On the other hand, NATO will also need to determine how to defend the two countries if attacked. This might not have been imaginable before February 2022.

The issue of deterrence and defense is therefore acutely significant in the context of geography: Finland shares a long land border with the Russian Federation and Sweden sits astride key maritime routes in and out of the Baltic Sea region — which are also crucial for Russia’s own security. After the incorporation of the Baltic States into the alliance in 2004, NATO went many years, surprisingly, without having formal defense plans for defending the three countries from external attack. Now, the security situation in Europe is much different, so NATO does not have the luxury of not developing defense and contingency plans for the defense of the two newest members of the alliance.

3. Finland and especially Sweden have a largely self-sufficient defence industry and large and strong active military personnel compared to other EU and NATO countries. If Sweden and Finland have to use NATO weapons as a consequence of NATO membership, what will be the impact and repercussions on the local arms industry and US arms exports?

This remains to be seen. To be sure, bringing Finland and Sweden into NATO opens up a new market for the U.S. defense industry. I suspect, however, that the domestic industries in Finland and Sweden will continue to have a dominant place in those countries. A potential interesting development would be the opposite phenomenon: Nordic defense industries having more exposure and influence in the U.S. market due to the two countries’ membership in NATO.It is of course unknown whether this will happen but it is a trend to look for over the next several years.

4. Finland and Sweden have carefully maintained their neutrality for decades. Although culturally in the Western camp, they have so far refrained from angering their giant nuclear-armed neighbour Russia. Much will change with this accession – will they be safer “inside the tent” under NATO’s collective protection known as “Article 5”?

Of course, the implicit threat of U.S. retaliation, including the use of nuclear weapons, is what underpins Article 5. Finland and Sweden will now formally enjoy such protection. I don’t think any of the so-called frontline NATO states care much about antagonizing Russia at this point. But, then again, threat perceptions can and do vary from country to country within the alliance. NATO has for many years discarded the old the rhetoric about integrating Russia into the European security order, which used to be a mainstay of its official pronouncements. Such rhetoric was still prevalent after the Russian invasion of Georgia in 2008 but largely disappeared after the annexation of Crimea in 2014.

Moving forward, I suspect Russia will attempt to challenge Article Five through unconventional means, including through the use of cyber attacks, as happened in Estonia in 2007.  NATO will have to respond to such incidents carefully and purposefully. For all the percieved protection that Article Five brings, it was written deliberately vague. While NATO members are compelled to aid an ally if it comes under attack, all the other allies are free to choose what sort of assistance they will bring. Thus, triggering an Article Five response does not necessarily mean a military response, strictly speaking.NATO faces many difficult challenges as it approaches it’s 75th anniversary this summer.

The post Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI), Lieutenant Colonel (Retired) Walter Rick Landgraf: “Both the Swedish and Finnish Armies Have Been Interoperable with NATO Forces for Many Years.” appeared first on ANKASAM | Ankara Center for Crisis and Policy Studies.

It is the first time Grossi being in Japan since the purified water release began in August. Grossi’s visit took place a day after Japan marked the 13^th anniversary of the 11^th March earthquake and tsunami that triggered the Fukushima disaster. The disaster occurred in 2011 damaged the power supply and reactor cooling functions of the Fukushima power plant, triggering a triple meltdown and causing a huge amount of radioactive wastewater buildup. After more than a decade of cleaning work, the plant began discharging water on 24th August after purifying and diluting it with seawater. The process is expected to take decades.[2]

These discharges have been opposed by all the neighbor states, including China, which has banned all seafood imports from Japan. Japan asked the IAEA for assistance in security monitoring and evaluation to address all the concerns. Grossi told Japanese Minister of Economic and Industry, Ken Saito that “it is very important to demonstrate the transparency of this process.”[3]

Grossi also offered technical assistance to Japan for optimizing the inactive Kashiwazaki-Kariwa nuclear power plant in the Niigita region of northern Japan, operated by Fukushina Daiichi. The company and the government want to restart the power plant soon. Kashiwazaki-Kariwa power plant’s reactors 6 and 7 passed regulators’ safety tests for restarting. However, after safety issues occurred in 2021, further preparations were suspended. That condition lasted until December, when regulators accepted to improve.^[4]

The IAEA is sending a team of experts to the plant for assisting Tokyo Electronic Power Company in its efforts to acquire public trust. “We want to help Japan’s nuclear capacity become operational as soon as possible,” Grossi told Saito. The restart of the power plant remains uncertain as it is a subject to be approved by the host community. The earthquake on 1^st January in the Noto region fomented safety concerns and led nuclear regulators to instruct a revision of evacuation plans for nuclear facilities across the country.^[5]

The Tokyo Government has reversed previous nuclear phase-out plans and is accelerating the use of nuclear energy in response to rising fuel costs due to Russia’s large-scale invasion of Ukraine and pressure to meet decarbonization targets. Grossi, who will meet the Foreign Minister Yoko Kamikawa on March 14, is expected to discuss nuclear disarmament, non-proliferation and cooperation with North Korea and Iran on the peaceful use of atomic energy.[6]

Officials have said Japan also wants to provide financial support to IAEA efforts to protect Ukrainian nuclear facilities from Russian attacks. In his meeting with IAEA president Rafael Grossi, the Japanese Environment Minister Shintaro Ito promised to cooperate with the IAEA on the disposal of the radioactive soil resulting from the decontamination works in Fukushima. This soil was placed in a temporary storage facility in Fukushima. The Government’s plan to recycle the soil after safety testing for road construction and other public works was confronted with violent protests. The Government has promised a final disposal plan outside the province until 2045.^[7]

The IAEA’s attitude towards Japan’s nuclear energy program can be examined through Grossi’s visit to Japan and the assessment of the situation at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant. Grossi’s promise to support and offer of technical assistance to Japan demonstrates IAEA’s role in providing cooperation and security to member states.

The environmental impacts of the Fukushima disaster, especially concerns about discharging the radioactive wastewater into seawater reflect environmental sensitivity and public reactions. Risks that occur because of nuclear energy operations and waste management strategies can be examined in terms of environmental sustainability and safety.

Japan’s opinion about seeing nuclear energy as clean and sustainable is a reflection about its energy policies and economic preferences. Rising energy costs, especially because of the Russia-Ukraine war, and pressures on decarbonization targets may have influenced Japan’s decision to accelerate the use of nuclear energy.

Issues such as the reactivation of nuclear facilities and the disposal of radioactive waste reflect society’s attitude towards energy policies and environmental policies. Discussions on these issues examine society’s perception and demands towards nuclear energy and environmental risks.

The role of the IAEA in monitoring and evaluating the safety of Japan’s nuclear facilities is important for international nuclear security and cooperation. Japan’s intention to provide financial support for Ukraine can be analyzed in relation to international nuclear policies and crises.

IAEA President Rafael Grossi’s visit to Japan and the support provided by the IAEA to Japan are important for international nuclear security and cooperation. However, the environmental impacts and social responsiveness to the Fukushima disaster, demonstrate the weakness of social acceptance and trust towards nuclear energy. Japan renewed focus on nuclear energy is shaped due to economic and geopolitical pressures.

As a result, strategies dealing with environmental and security risks of nuclear energy influence both, Japan’s domestic policy and international security debates. Therefore, it is critical to take further decisions based on environmental sustainability, society admission and international cooperation.

[1] “UN Nuclear Chief tells Japan Transparency is ‘Very Important’ in Ruined Nuclear Plant’s Discharges”, Associated Press News, https://apnews.com/article/japan-iaea-grossi-fukushima-nuclear-discharge-d96d22a1ae5acb92154b38af503cd43d, (Date of Access: 13/03/2024).

[2] “UN Nuclear Chief Tells Japan Transparency is ‘Very Important’ in Ruined Nuclear Plant’s Discharges”, ABC News, https://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory/nuclear-chief-visits-japan-examine-fukushima-wastewater-release-108038384, (Date of Access: 13/03/2024).

[3] “IAEA Chief Reassures Residents that Treated Wastewater Discharge at Fukushima Nuclear Plant is Safe”, The Washington Post, https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2024/03/13/japan-iaea-fukushima-nuclear-grossi-discharge/83577d9a-e0f5-11ee-95aa-7384336086f3_story.html, (Date of Access: 13/03/2024).

[4] “UN Nuclear Chief tells Japan Transparency is ‘Very Important’ in Ruined Nuclear Plant’s Discharges”, Associated Press News, https://apnews.com/article/japan-iaea-grossi-fukushima-nuclear-discharge-d96d22a1ae5acb92154b38af503cd43d, (Date of Access: 13/03/2024).

[5] “UN Nuclear Chief Tells Japan Transparency is ‘Very Important’ in Ruined Nuclear Plant’s Discharges”, ABC News, https://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory/nuclear-chief-visits-japan-examine-fukushima-wastewater-release-108038384, (Date of Access: 13/03/2024).

[6] “IAEA Chief Reassures Residents that Treated Wastewater Discharge at Fukushima Nuclear Plant is Safe”, The Washington Post, https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2024/03/13/japan-iaea-fukushima-nuclear-grossi-discharge/83577d9a-e0f5-11ee-95aa-7384336086f3_story.html, (Date of Access: 13/03/2024).

[7] “UN Nuclear Chief Tells Japan Transparency is ‘Very Important’ in Ruined Nuclear Plant’s Discharges”, ABC News, https://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory/nuclear-chief-visits-japan-examine-fukushima-wastewater-release-108038384, (Date of Access: 13/03/2024).

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President of Kazakhstan Kassym-Jomart Tokayev made this statement in his speech at the plenary session of the Boao Asia Forum (BAF), held annually in China’s Hainan province, Trend reported on Thursday.

“It is of great importance that we step up our efforts to develop both existing and new transport routes. This includes the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route, or the Middle Corridor, which most effectively secures supply chains between Asia and Europe. Last year, the volume of cargo traffic on this route doubled to 3 million tonnes. We expect this figure to reach 10 million tonnes in the coming years. At the same time, Kazakhstan is ready to cooperate with its neighbours in the development of the North-South corridor.”

Tokayev said that the expansion of transit and transport cooperation between Asian countries is of strategic importance.

It should be noted that the Central Corridor connects the container rail freight transport networks of China and the European Union countries through the countries of Central Asia, the Caucasus, Turkey and Eastern Europe.

The multilateral multimodal transport infrastructure connects ferry terminals in the Caspian Sea and the Black Sea with the railway systems of China, Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Turkey, Ukraine and Poland.

The central corridor facilitates increasing cargo traffic from China to Turkey and Europe.

A train travelling along this corridor can deliver cargo from China to Europe in 20-25 days on average, which is one of the most important advantages of this transport corridor.

It should be noted that the foundation of the North-South transport corridor was laid on the basis of an intergovernmental agreement signed between Russia, Iran and India on 12 September 2000.

A total of 13 countries (Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bulgaria, Armenia, India, Iran, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Oman, Russian Federation, Tajikistan, Turkey and Ukraine) have ratified this agreement.

https://www.trend.az/casia/kazakhstan/3878526.html

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Axel Wernhoff, Sweden’s representative at NATO, told the European edition of Politico newspaper, the Report reported, citing TASS.

“Wernhoff confirmed Sweden’s plan to send troops to this country as part of NATO’s presence in Latvia. Sweden plans to start the operation from November, its troops will rotate with Danish troops. Individual operations, such as mine countermeasures, may start earlier.”

Wernhoff also believes that Nato will have to deal with the military threat from Russia for decades to come.

https://report.az/ru/drAugie-strany/shveciya-namerena-napravit-vojska-v-sostav-boevoj-gruppy-nato-v-latvii-s-noyabrya/

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The inaugural meeting of the South Korea-US bilateral Enhanced Disruption Task Force was held in Washington, D.C., on Tuesday with over 30 officials in areas of diplomacy, intelligence, sanctions and maritime interdiction, according to the ministry.

During the meeting, the two sides discussed ways to counter illicit efforts by North Korea to circumvent sanctions concerning the procurement of refined petroleum, stressing that importing refined oil in excess of the UN-mandated cap violates UN Security Council resolutions.

They also highlighted the need for close cooperation to counter the North’s ability to procure petroleum, including from Russia, saying it directly contributes to the reclusive country’s military readiness and its weapons development.

https://www.koreaherald.com/view.php?ud=20240327050150

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“When it comes to the reliability and the effectiveness of our energy cooperation, we are absolutely satisfied. We have received so far all energy resources on time, according to the contract on the agreed price. So, there is no reason why not to work on the further improvement and the further widening of this cooperation,” the minister said.

Szijjarto also noted that he had always had friendly relations with Russian Deputy Prime Minister Alexander Novak who is responsible for energy policy. “Whether we like it or not, we must admit that without the supplies from Russia, the safe supply of Hungary when it comes to energy would not be possible,” he said, adding that “without the Russian resources, it would be impossible to supply the country with gas, with oil and with the nuclear fuel.”

https://tass.com/world/1766465

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Li said that since the establishment of the open and pragmatic partnership for comprehensive cooperation between the two countries in 2014, the development of relations between China and the Netherlands has been on a fast track, with fruitful cooperation in various fields and tangible benefits for the two peoples.

China is willing to work with the Netherlands to continue to carry forward the spirit of open and pragmatic cooperation, promote the steady development of bilateral relations and achieve more win-win results, Li said.

He said that China and the Netherlands are both committed to free trade and should continue to open wider to each other and strengthen practical cooperation. This will help consolidate and deepen bilateral relations, serve the fundamental interests of the two peoples and inject more stability and certainty into the world, he added.

https://english.news.cn/20240327/12ab992df9a84c1fac527e10919b1ba6/c.html

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TASS said that Baek, whose case was classified as “top secret”, was being held in Lefortovo Prison, and on March 11, 2024, a court decided to extend his detention until June 15. The agency stated that an unnamed law enforcement official said that Baek “transferred information that was a state secret to foreign intelligence services.” No further details have been made public.[2]

The South Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs said in a statement that its consulate has provided assistance since it was learned that Baek was detained. The ministry refused to provide further details on the matter, citing the ongoing investigation. Yonhap News Agency’s Korean service said Baek was a missionary tasked with rescuing North Korean refugees and providing humanitarian aid. The agency added that Baek was detained a few days after arriving in Vladivostok by land from China in January 2024. With this incident, for the first time a South Korean was detained in Russia on espionage charges.[3]

Russia described South Korea as an “unfriendly” country in 2022 due to its support for Western sanctions. After North Korean Leader Kim Jong Un went to Russia last September and met with Russian President Vladimir Putin, Russia also deepened its relations with North Korea.[4]

The United States (US) and its allies in the Asia-Pacific Region, such as South Korea and Japan, accuse North Korea of providing weapons to Russia for use in the Ukraine war in exchange for technological know-how that will advance its military modernization program. However, both countries rejected these claims. Over the past year, Russia has detained many foreign nationals and accused them of various crimes.[5]

American journalist Evan Gershkovich was also detained in March 2023 on allegations of espionage and is also being held in Lefortovo prison, which is famous for its harsh conditions and keeping detainees in almost complete isolation. The detention period was extended until the end of March 2024 and court proceedings were held behind closed doors. In October, Russian-US journalist Alsu Kurmasheva was detained for failing to register as a foreign agent and was later accused of spreading “false information” about the Russian Army. The detention period has been extended until April. In Russia, the crime of espionage requires a maximum prison sentence of 20 years. At the same point, Gershkovich and Kurmasheva deny the accusations against them.[6]

It is important whether Russia sees the espionage accusations as a political move against South Korea or as a real security threat. The political context of espionage accusations is a noteworthy issue, especially considering Russia’s tensions with the West due to the Ukraine Crisis and its relations with North Korea.

The extension of the detainee’s detention until June 15 and his/her detention in Lefortovo Prison can be evaluated in terms of the transparency of the legal process and human rights violations. The legality and justice of practices such as court proceedings held behind closed doors and isolating detainees can be questioned.

It can be argued that Russia’s espionage accusations have an impact on the dynamics in international relations. The impact of espionage accusations, especially in relations with the USA and the countries of the Asia-Pacific Region, is important for regional security and stability.

The situation of foreign journalists detained in Russia on espionage charges is important in terms of media freedom and freedom of the press. Harsh conditions in Lefortovo Prison and the isolation of detainees may affect journalists’ working conditions and freedom of expression.

It has been stated that the crime of espionage in Russia requires a maximum prison sentence of 20 years. At this point, it can be emphasized that espionage accusations must be supported by evidence and a fair trial process must be ensured.

In this context, Russia’s detention of a South Korean person on espionage charges and the subsequent developments are worth examining. Espionage accusations constitute an important example to address Russia’s dynamics in international relations, domestic political situation and human rights issues. Practices such as extending the detention of detainees and keeping detainees in Lefortovo Prison are worrying in terms of the transparency of the legal process and the principles of fair trial. Additionally, espionage accusations have the potential to increase tensions in international relations.

As a result, it is important for Russia to conduct the legal process regarding espionage accusations in a transparent and fair manner, respect human rights and act in accordance with international norms. This could help prevent potential consequences that could affect Russia’s relations with the international community and political stability within the country.

[1] “Russia Detains South Korean in Country’s East on Suspicion of Spying”, Al Jazeera, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/3/12/russia-detains-south-korean-in-countrys-east-on-suspicion-of-spying, (Date of Accesion: 13.03.2024).

[2] “Russia Detains South Korean Man on Espionage Charges”, British Broadcast Corporation, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-68541185, (Date of Accesion: 13.03.2024).

[3] “South Korean Held in Russia for Spying Was a Missionary, say Media Reports”, Reuters, https://www.reuters.com/world/south-korean-held-russia-spying-was-missionary-say-media-reports-2024-03-12/, (Date of Accesion: 13.03.2024).

[4] South Korean Detained Earlier This Year Is Accused of Espionage in Russia, The Diplomat, https://thediplomat.com/2024/03/south-korean-detained-earlier-this-year-is-accused-of-espionage-in-russia/, (Date of Accesion: 13.03.2024).

[5] “Russia Detains South Korean in Country’s East on Suspicion of Spying”, Al Jazeera, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/3/12/russia-detains-south-korean-in-countrys-east-on-suspicion-of-spying, (Date of Accesion: 13.03.2024).

[6] “Russia Detains South Korean Man on Espionage Charges”, British Broadcast Corporation, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-68541185, (Date of Accesion: 13.03.2024).

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Trump’s China policy tends to embrace a unilateral approach parallel to his overall foreign policy strategy. This inclination leads Trump to focus on direct bilateral negotiations with China considering his own concerns. Additionally, Trump’s prominent “America First” principle in both domestic and foreign policies directly influence his policy towards China. Trump’s reluctance to involve America in costly wars under the “America First” principle, coupled with his talk of withdrawal from partnerships and diminishing ties with regional allies of the United States, helps alleviate pressures on China.

Trump has been seen criticizing defense agreements with Japan and South Korea and threatening to withdraw some USA troops stationed in these allied countries.[2] Analysts suggest that the decrease in American alliances in the region, including designs concerning Taiwan’s self-governing democracy, would be advantageous to China.[3] On the other hand, the “America First” mantra has led Trump to adopt protectionist strategies to support USA manufacturing, intensifying the USA-China trade war. A prominent feature of USA-China relations during the Trump era has been the short-term maintenance of areas where cooperation or partnership could be achieved, while unresolved issues have directly turned into conflict.

Trump, with the National Security Strategy he announced in late 2017, initiated direct competition between Washington and Beijing by defining China as a “rival” and “revisionist power”.[4] This strategy includes challenging China in various areas such as trade warfare. Especially in the final year of the Trump administration, more uncertainty and direct conflict elements have been added to China-USA relations. Trump deliberately heightened security concerns, including the Taiwan Strait, imposed punitive tariffs on Chinese goods, and imposed extensive restrictions on Chinese technology companies, such as Huawei, ZTE, and TikTok, causing serious damage to bilateral relations.[5]

Unlike Trump’s sudden, short-term, and unilateral tough policies, the Biden administration is striving to base competition with China on a more sustainable and long-term policy, while safeguarding US interests. In addition, unlike Trump, Biden is willing to maintain the necessary strategic communication with China and seek cooperation on various issues, such as climate change.

Biden sees technology as the key element of strategic competition with China. In this regard, he is attempting to restrict access to technological products by imposing restrictions and sanctions on Chinese entities. After taking office, he largely maintained the tariffs imposed during the Trump era and subsequently added a series of policies aimed at preventing the import of American high technology and finance from China, used to enhance China’s military and technological capabilities.[6] While Biden may not increase tariffs on China, it is believed that he could significantly reduce China’s ability to produce high-tech products. Additionally, on the Taiwan issue, Biden has occasionally stated that the United States would militarily defend the island if it were attacked, presenting himself as a staunch supporter of Taiwan. Trump has suggested that the next Biden administration may see “a more successful multilateral, collaborative effort aimed at constraining China”.[7]

Trump has promised to return to a hardline policy stance against Beijing by designating China as a rival. During his election campaign, he raised speculation that he could impose tariffs of up to 60% on Chinese imports to combat what he sees as unfair trade practices and could cancel the fundamental status of “permanently normalized trade relations”.[8] Trump’s return with massive trade tariffs will negatively affect the Chinese economy. This would push Chinese leaders to establish closer relations with alternative markets. Furthermore, Trump has stated that if he were to be re-elected, Biden’s Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF) would be “dead on first day”.[9] Disrupting this framework signed by 13 regional countries under Biden’s leadership to balance against China’s economic influence could also undermine America’s partnerships with other countries.

Trump’s anti-China rhetoric during his election campaign suggests the possibility of initiating a second trade war. However, it is evident that the trade war has inflicted more harm than benefit on the US economy. The high tariffs imposed on Chinese goods have neither increased US production nor reduced the trade deficit with China. Instead, US companies and consumers have borne the burden of the tariffs on Chinese imports, leading to higher costs for businesses and a significant decline in the international competitiveness of US products.[10]

Approximately a year ago, most rural Republicans rejected Trump’s proposal to impose new tariffs on Chinese imports and concerned Republicans cautiously aligned with various Democrats against such a possibility, indicating further divisions among Republicans. This suggests that initiating a new trade war with China will further deepen the divisions among Republicans. This also indicates that the new era of strategic competition between the US and China will focus more on technology rather than trade wars.

Miles Yu, Director of the China Center at Hudson Institute, has stated that the United States has reached a bipartisan agreement on China and that both sides share “pretty much the same China policy”.[11] As a result, regardless of who is elected in the 2024 presidential election, they will continue to view China as their main rival and maintain tough policies against China. While differences in immediate policy responses may distinguish Trump from Biden in the short term, in the long run, US policies towards China may not differ significantly between Trump and Biden. However, Trump’s sudden and short-term policies make him an unpredictable force, and this means that China needs to be more prepared.

[1] “Biden slightly behind Trump but voters’ views of economy improve, poll shows”, The Guardian, https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2024/mar/13/biden-trump-economy-poll, (Date of Access: 20.03.2024).

[2] “China is worried about the return of Trump, but it also sees opportunities if he wins”, CNN, https://www.cnn.com/2024/03/10/china/china-two-sessions-trump-election-analysis-intl-hnk/index.html, (Date of Access: 20.03.2024).

[3] Ibid.

[4] “Biden vs Trump: Who Would Have a Bigger Impact on China-US Relations?”, The Diplomat, https://thediplomat.com/2023/12/biden-vs-trump-who-would-have-a-bigger-impact-on-china-us-relations/, (Date of Access: 19.03.2024).

[5] Ibid.

[6] “China is worried about the return of Trump, but it also sees opportunities if he wins”, CNN, https://www.cnn.com/2024/03/10/china/china-two-sessions-trump-election-analysis-intl-hnk/index.html, (Date of Access: 20.03.2024).

[7] Ibid.

[8] Ibid.

[9] “Trump vows to kill Asia trade deal being pursued by Biden if elected”, Reuters, https://www.reuters.com/world/us/trump-vows-kill-asia-trade-deal-being-pursued-by-biden-if-elected-2023-11-19/, (Date of Access: 21.03.2024).

[10] “Would Donald Trump Start a China-US Trade War 2.0?”, The Diplomat, https://thediplomat.com/2024/02/would-donald-trump-start-a-china-us-trade-war-2-0/, (Date of Access: 21.03.2024).

[11] “China sees two ‘bowls of poison’ in Biden and Trump and ponders who is the lesser of two evils”, AP, https://apnews.com/article/china-us-election-biden-trump-7308b0d650b8ea309f343dec00d0b827, (Date of Access: 22.03.2024).

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